Sioux Falls Fire 24.4% Funded Ratio: Bottom 10 US Public Pensions

Findings

Sioux Falls Fire ranks worst at 24.4 percent funded ratio

PlainPension's pensions table indexes 197 US public pension plans with funded ratio column values for State General, Teachers, Public Safety, and Municipal types. Sioux Falls Fire plan holds the lowest funded ratio at 24.4 percent alongside $0.65 billion unfunded liability. Public Plans Database, Center for State and Local Government Excellence This Public Safety plan entry anchors the dataset's bottom percentile in funded ratio distribution.

The funded ratio column in PlainPension captures Sioux Falls Fire at 24.4 percent while 15 California plans average 77.5 percent funded ratio across $408.79 billion unfunded liabilities. Sioux Falls Fire's $0.65 billion unfunded liability contrasts Texas's 12 plans with $137.47 billion total unfunded liability at 73.4 percent average funded ratio. Pew Charitable Trusts, State Retirement Systems Study Rows are matched to their sponsoring state to aggregate state-level metrics like New York's 7 plans at 92.4 percent average funded ratio.

Sioux Falls Fire populates the Public Safety category in PlainPension's 197 plans total with its 24.4 percent funded ratio value. Unfunded liability column lists $0.65 billion for this plan amid Ohio's 5 plans carrying $121.36 billion unfunded liability at 66.8 percent average funded ratio. National Association of State Retirement Administrators, Public Fund Survey Municipal plans like Sioux Falls Fire feed into per-state funded-ratio rankings.

PlainPension funded ratio metrics position Sioux Falls Fire at 24.4 percent below Des Moines Water Works' 28.0 percent value in the same dataset. This plan's $0.65 billion unfunded liability appears in the pensions table alongside Washington's 2 plans at 73.7 percent average funded ratio with $98.44 billion unfunded liability. The methodology page details funded ratio calculations from raw submissions.

Providence Employees and City of Miami Fire/Police anchor positions 2 and 3

Providence Employees Retirement System records 24.6 percent funded ratio in PlainPension's 197-plan dataset with $1.39 billion unfunded liability. City of Miami Firefighters and Police Officers Retirement Trust follows at 25.8 percent funded ratio carrying $4.51 billion unfunded liability. Public Plans Database, Center for State and Local Government Excellence Both entries populate Municipal and Public Safety types in the pensions table.

PlainPension lists Providence Employees at 24.6 percent funded ratio while Louisiana's 9 plans average 76.8 percent funded ratio across $23.40 billion unfunded liability. City of Miami Fire/Police funded ratio stands at 25.8 percent against California's 15 plans' 77.5 percent average and $408.79 billion unfunded liability total. Pew Charitable Trusts, State Retirement Systems Study Unfunded-liability figures enable plan-to-state comparisons.

City of Miami Fire/Police plan holds 25.8 percent funded ratio in the dataset's Public Safety rows with $4.51 billion unfunded liability exceeding Sioux Falls Fire's $0.65 billion figure. Providence Employees' 24.6 percent funded ratio slots into Municipal category amid Ohio's 66.8 percent state average for 5 plans and $121.36 billion unfunded liability. National Association of State Retirement Administrators, Public Fund Survey These plans contribute to bottom rankings in funded ratio across 197 total entries.

Providence Employees populates PlainPension pensions table at 24.6 percent funded ratio while Texas 12 plans reach 73.4 percent average funded ratio with $137.47 billion unfunded liability. City of Miami Fire/Police $4.51 billion unfunded liability contrasts New York 7 plans' $65.12 billion total at 92.4 percent average. Data methodology reproduces funded ratio from source submissions without alteration.

Des Moines Water Works at 28.0 percent funded with $0.14B unfunded liability

Des Moines Water Works records 28.0 percent funded ratio in PlainPension dataset with $0.14 billion unfunded liability across 197 plans, the fourth-worst funded ratio in the dataset. This General State plan is one of Iowa's 3 indexed plans, which together average 73.9 percent funded ratio and $3.59 billion total unfunded liability - Des Moines Water Works alone drags Iowa's average down despite its tiny dollar footprint. Des Moines Water Works profile details plan-specific metrics.

PlainPension pensions table lists Des Moines Water Works at 28.0 percent funded ratio while Ohio's 5 plans average 66.8 percent funded ratio with $121.36 billion unfunded liability. Des Moines Water Works' $0.14 billion unfunded liability is dwarfed by Louisiana's 9 plans at $23.40 billion total, despite Louisiana's 76.8 percent average funded ratio far outranking this single plan. State-level linkage connects worst-funded municipal plans to broader state aggregates via Iowa pension overview.

The 28.0 percent funded ratio for Des Moines Water Works appears in General State category rows of the 197-plan dataset alongside a comparatively tiny $0.14 billion unfunded liability. California's 15 plans hold $408.79 billion unfunded liability at 77.5 percent average funded ratio. Washington's 2 plans list $98.44 billion unfunded liability at 73.7 percent average funded ratio.

Des Moines Water Works funded ratio at 28.0 percent contrasts Texas 12 plans' 73.4 percent average and $137.47 billion unfunded liability in PlainPension. This plan's $0.14 billion unfunded liability sits well below City of Miami Fire/Police $4.51 billion unfunded liability, even though Miami's 25.8 percent funded ratio is slightly worse. Ohio pension overview shows comparative state burdens; California pension overview aggregates 15 plans' metrics.

Sioux Falls Fire at 24.4 percent funded ratio leads PlainPension's worst rankings in the 197-plan pensions table, followed by Providence Employees at 24.6 percent and City of Miami Fire/Police at 25.8 percent, with Des Moines Water Works at 28.0 percent rounding out the bottom four amid a mix of municipal General State and Public Safety shortfalls. Iowa's $3.59 billion total unfunded liability across 3 plans is modest next to Ohio's $121.36 billion via 5 plans, while Ohio's 66.8 percent average funded ratio marks the lowest among top burden states like California at 77.5 percent over 15 plans and $408.79 billion unfunded liability total. Funded ratio columns across dataset types reveal municipal plans like Sioux Falls Fire ($0.65 billion) and Des Moines Water Works ($0.14 billion) concentrate the worst funded-ratio positions despite tiny dollar exposure, contrasting state aggregates such as New York's 92.4 percent average for 7 plans.

Comparative jurisdictional notes

Public pension plans tracked in the Public Plans Database are predominantly defined-benefit (DB) single-employer arrangements sponsored by state or local governments, contrasting sharply with the private-sector landscape where defined-contribution (DC) 401(k) and 403(b) plans now dominate worker coverage. Single-employer DB plans like CalPERS, CalSTRS, and NYSLRS pool actuarial risk across one sponsor, whereas multiemployer plans (common in Taft-Hartley industries) spread that risk across multiple contributing employers. Multiple-employer plans split the difference, allowing several unrelated employers to share a plan administrator without joint-liability provisions. National Association of State Retirement Administrators, NASRA Public Fund Survey, 2024

State-sponsored systems differ from federal plans (FERS, CSRS, TSP) in funding mechanics: federal civilian retirement is paid through Treasury appropriations rather than a pre-funded actuarial pool, while state plans must hit annual required contribution (ARC) targets to maintain funded ratios. Among state systems, control-state vs license-state administrative models do not apply to pensions, but parallel jurisdictional carve-outs exist between systems that consolidate teachers, public-safety, and general employees into one trust (e.g. Wisconsin Retirement System) versus systems that segregate by occupation (Texas TRS for teachers, ERS for general employees, separate municipal and county systems). Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB), enhanced multiplier formulas, and earlier normal-retirement-age provisions further differentiate plan tiers within a single sponsor. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, Public Plans Data, 2024

Cash balance and pension equity hybrid plans occupy a middle ground between traditional DB and DC structures: participants accrue notional account balances credited with pay credits and interest credits, but the plan retains investment risk on the asset side. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006) clarified hybrid-plan compliance through age-discrimination safe harbors and conversion protections, prompting several state and large municipal plans (notably Kansas, Nebraska, and Tennessee for new hires) to adopt hybrid designs. The Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act (SECURE Act 2019) and SECURE 2.0 Act 2022 introduced auto-enrollment, auto-escalation, and Required Minimum Distribution age changes (73 effective 2023 under SECURE 2.0 §107, transitioning to 75 in 2033) that affect DC plans more than DB plans, but reshape the broader retirement-savings landscape that public pensions sit within.

Compared with private-sector DB plans governed by ERISA Title I (labor) and Title IV (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation termination insurance), public pensions are explicitly exempt from ERISA under §4(b)(1) - instead operating under state constitutional protections, state pension code, and Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) reporting standards. GASB Statement 67 (financial reporting for plans) and Statement 68 (employer reporting) require public plans to disclose net pension liability on the sponsor government's balance sheet using a single discount rate that blends expected return and high-quality municipal bond yield when assets are projected insufficient. Private-plan Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) backstop is unavailable to public-plan members; instead, full-faith-and-credit pledges of the sponsoring state or municipality serve as the de facto guarantee, with severity of legal protection varying by state constitutional language (some states explicitly forbid benefit reductions, others permit prospective reform). Government Accounting Standards Board, Statements 67 and 68, 2014

Pension and ERISA reference notes

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, Pub. L. 93-406) organizes private-sector retirement law across four titles: Title I (Labor, fiduciary duty under §404(a)(1) prudent-expert standard, reporting and disclosure under Form 5500, prohibited transactions under §406 with statutory exemptions in §408), Title II (Internal Revenue Code amendments, qualified plan tax treatment under §401(a)), Title III (Jurisdiction, DOL Employee Benefits Security Administration enforcement and Treasury IRS enforcement coordination), and Title IV (Plan Termination Insurance, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation single-employer and multiemployer programs). Public plans are exempt from ERISA per §4(b)(1) but adopt many parallel governance principles voluntarily through state code. Public Law 93-406, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

Form 5500 is the annual report required of nearly all ERISA-covered plans, with attached schedules tailored to plan size and structure: Schedule A (insurance contract information), Schedule B (actuarial information for DB plans, replaced by Schedule MB for multiemployer and Schedule SB for single-employer post-PPA), Schedule C (service-provider compensation disclosure under 408(b)(2)), Schedule D (multi-employer plan information), Schedule G (financial transactions including non-exempt prohibited transactions), Schedule H (large-plan financial statements with Part I asset-allocation breakdown into equity, fixed income, alternatives, real estate, and cash), Schedule I (small-plan financial statements), and Schedule R (retirement plan distributions and ESOP information). Public plans typically file equivalent state-level actuarial valuations rather than Form 5500.

Defined benefit (DB) plans encompass single-employer pensions sponsored by one company, multi-employer plans jointly trusteed under collective bargaining agreements (Taft-Hartley plans), and multiple-employer plans operated by professional employer organizations or association sponsors. Defined contribution (DC) plans include 401(k), 403(b) for nonprofit and educational employers, 457 deferred compensation for state and local government workers, 401(a) money-purchase and profit-sharing plans, ESOPs (Employee Stock Ownership Plans), and target-benefit plans. Since the Pension Protection Act of 2006, automatic-enrollment and automatic-escalation features became the dominant 401(k) design pattern, with the SECURE Act 2019 expanding eligibility for long-term part-time workers and the SECURE 2.0 Act 2022 introducing emergency savings sidecars, student-loan-matching contributions, and the Saver's Match. Internal Revenue Code §§401(a), 401(k), 403(b), 457

Internal Revenue Code §415(b) caps the annual benefit payable from a DB plan at the lesser of 100 percent of the participant's high-three average compensation or a statutory dollar limit (in 2024, $275,000), while §415(c) caps DC annual additions at the lesser of 100 percent of compensation or another statutory dollar limit (in 2024, $69,000 including employer contributions plus catch-up). The §402(g) elective-deferral limit governs employee 401(k) and 403(b) salary deferrals (in 2024, $23,000 base plus $7,500 catch-up at age 50, with the SECURE 2.0 Act adding a super-catch-up of $11,250 for participants ages 60 through 63 starting in 2025). Compensation eligible for plan purposes is itself capped under §401(a)(17) at $345,000 in 2024.

Nondiscrimination testing is the cornerstone of qualified-plan compliance: the Actual Deferral Percentage (ADP) test and Actual Contribution Percentage (ACP) test compare highly compensated employee participation against non-highly compensated employee participation in 401(k) deferrals and matching, with corrective distributions of excess contributions required if a plan fails. The Top-Heavy test under §416 requires minimum benefits or contributions for non-key employees when key employees hold more than 60 percent of plan assets. The §401(a)(4) general nondiscrimination test verifies that benefits or contributions do not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees, with safe-harbor design (Safe Harbor 401(k) under §401(k)(12) or Qualified Automatic Contribution Arrangement QACA under §401(k)(13)) eliminating ADP/ACP testing in exchange for matching or nonelective contribution commitments. The §410(b) coverage test ensures the plan benefits a sufficient percentage of non-highly compensated employees relative to highly compensated employees. Treasury Regulation §1.401(a)(4) - General Nondiscrimination Rules

Roth 401(k) contributions, after-tax contributions, and the mega-backdoor-Roth strategy enable participants to direct after-tax dollars into qualified plans for tax-free growth. In-service distributions before separation from service are permitted only in narrow circumstances (age 59½ for elective deferrals, age 62 for DB pension benefits under PPA 2006), while hardship withdrawals under §401(k) safe-harbor reasons (medical expenses, primary-residence purchase, post-secondary tuition, eviction or foreclosure prevention, funeral expenses, casualty loss, federally declared disaster, terminal illness under SECURE 2.0) require demonstration of immediate and heavy financial need. Qualified plan loans up to the lesser of $50,000 or 50 percent of vested balance under §72(p) avoid taxable-distribution treatment if repaid on schedule.

Required Minimum Distributions (RMDs) under §401(a)(9) begin at age 73 for participants born 1951-1959 (per SECURE 2.0 §107) and shift to age 75 for those born in 1960 or later effective 2033. The Uniform Lifetime Table calculates the RMD as account balance divided by the life-expectancy factor for the participant's age; the joint-and-last-survivor table applies when the sole beneficiary is a spouse more than ten years younger. RMDs from Roth 401(k) accounts were eliminated by SECURE 2.0 §325 effective 2024, harmonizing them with Roth IRAs. The qualified default investment alternative (QDIA) safe harbor under DOL Reg. §2550.404c-5 protects fiduciaries who default participants who fail to make affirmative investment elections into target-date funds, balanced funds, or managed accounts.

Fiduciary duty under ERISA §404(a)(1) requires plan fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries, with the prudent-expert standard demanding the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that a prudent person familiar with such matters would exercise, a higher bar than the common-law prudent-investor standard. Plan fiduciaries include the named plan administrator under §3(16), trustees under §403, investment managers under §3(38) (registered investment advisers, banks, or qualified insurance companies who acknowledge fiduciary status in writing and gain ERISA §405(d) liability allocation), and §3(21) investment advisors who provide investment recommendations. The 408(b)(2) service-provider fee disclosure rule mandates written disclosure of direct and indirect compensation, while 404(c) participant-directed-investment safe harbor relieves fiduciaries from individual investment-decision liability when participants control their own accounts and receive prescribed disclosures. ERISA §404(a)(1) - Fiduciary Duties

Prohibited transactions under ERISA §406 forbid sales, exchanges, leases, loans, or services between a plan and a party in interest (including the sponsor, fiduciaries, and affiliates), with statutory exemptions in §408 for routine plan operations such as participant loans (§408(b)(1)), reasonable arrangements with service providers (§408(b)(2)), and the QPAM (Qualified Professional Asset Manager) class exemption PTE 84-14 that allows transactions between a plan and a party in interest when an unrelated qualified asset manager directs them. PTE 2020-02 (the DOL fiduciary investment-advice rule) was vacated by the Fifth Circuit in 2024, leaving the 1975 five-part test and the SEC Regulation Best Interest framework as the operative standards for retirement-account investment recommendations.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) operates two federal insurance programs for private DB plans: the single-employer program (covering approximately 23 million participants in 24,000 plans) charges a per-participant flat-rate premium plus a variable-rate premium based on unfunded vested benefits, with a Risk-Based Premium structure introduced under MAP-21 (Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act). The multiemployer program covers approximately 11 million participants in 1,400 collectively-bargained plans and historically faced insolvency until the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act 2014 (MPRA) authorized benefit suspensions in critical-and-declining plans, followed by the American Rescue Plan Act 2021 §9704 Special Financial Assistance (SFA) program providing up to $86 billion in PBGC grants to keep insolvent multiemployer plans solvent through 2051. Plan terminations occur in three forms: standard termination (sufficient assets), distress termination (sponsor financial inability), and involuntary termination initiated by PBGC. Public pension plans receive no PBGC backstop. PBGC Annual Report, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 2024

Defined-benefit plan funding rules under PPA 2006 require minimum contributions that gradually amortize unfunded liabilities, with benefit restrictions imposed when the Adjusted Funding Target Attainment Percentage (AFTAP) falls below 80 percent (limits on accelerated benefit payments and amendments increasing benefits) or below 60 percent (suspension of future benefit accruals). The MAP-21, HATFA (Highway and Transportation Funding Act 2014), and BBA 2015 (Bipartisan Budget Act 2015) introduced segment-rate stabilization that smoothed corporate-bond-rate movements through a 25-year average corridor, controversial because it artificially reduced contribution requirements while increasing PBGC variable-rate premium revenue. Liability-driven investing (LDI) and asset-liability matching (ALM) frameworks aim to immunize the funded ratio against interest-rate movements by aligning fixed-income duration with liability duration, while glide-path target-date fund design progressively de-risks participant accounts as the target retirement date approaches.

For more on how PlainPension extracts these data points from upstream Public Plans Database releases, see our methodology page. Plan-level rankings, state aggregates, and the underlying historical funded-ratio series are accessible from each plan profile, and corrections can be flagged through the contact form for review in the next refresh cycle.